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ABSTRACT
Low-power wide-area network technologies such as LoRaWAN
are important for achieving ubiquitous connectivity required by
the Internet of Things. Due to limited bandwidth, LoRaWAN is
primarily for applications of collecting low-rate monitoring data
from geographically distributed sensors. In these applications, sen-
sor data timestamping is often a critical system function. This pa-
per considers a synchronization-free approach of timestamping
the uplink data at the LoRaWAN gateway, which can give mil-
liseconds accuracy. Its key advantages are simplicity and no ex-
tra overhead, commensurate with the scarce communication re-
sources of LoRaWAN. However, we show that this low-overhead
approach is susceptible to a frame delay attack that can be im-
plemented by a combination of stealthy jamming and delayed re-
play. To address this threat, we propose a SoftLoRa gateway design
that integrates a commodity LoRaWAN gateway with a low-power
software-defined radio receiver to track the inherent frequency bi-
ases of LoRaWAN end devices. With a set of efficient signal pro-
cessing algorithms that are designed based on LoRaWAN’s modu-
lation method, our frequency bias estimation achieves a resolution
of 0.14 parts-per-million (ppm) of the channel’s central frequency.
This resolution is sufficient to detect the attack that introduces an
additional frequency bias of one or more ppm. We evaluate our ap-
proach in various indoor and outdoor environments. In summary,
this paper presents an attack-aware and low-overhead approach to
timestamping the data generated by LoRaWAN end devices.
1 INTRODUCTION
Low-power wide-area networks (LPWANs) enable direct wireless
interconnections among end devices and gateways in geographic
areas of up to tens of square kilometers [19]. It will increase the
network connectivity as a defining characteristic of the Internet of
Things (IoT). Among various LPWAN technologies (including NB-
IoT and Sigfox), LoRaWAN [22], which is an open data link layer
specification based on the LoRa physical layer technique, offers the
advantages of using license-free ISM bands (e.g., EU 868MHz and
US 915MHz), low costs for end devices, and independence from
managed infrastructures (e.g., cellular networks).
LoRaWAN is promising for the applications of collecting low-
rate monitoring data from geographically distributed sensors, such
as utility meters, environment sensors, roadway detectors, indus-
trial IoT measurement devices, and etc. Most of these real-world
monitoring applications require the sensing data to have times-
tamps in the global time, though the timestamps do not have to
be highly accurate such as microseconds level. For instance, in
both indoor and outdoor environment condition monitoring, sec-
onds accuracy for sensor data timestamps will be sufficient due to
the slow dynamics of the environment condition. Second-accurate
timestamps for the traffic data generated by roadway detectors can
be used to reconstruct real-time traffic maps well. In a range of in-
dustrial monitoring applications such as oil pipeline monitoring
[6], milliseconds accuracy is sufficient.
Conventionally, to perform the data timestamping in a wireless
sensor network (WSN) for data collection, the clocks of the sen-
sor nodes need to be synchronized, such that the nodes can times-
tamp their data once generated. To achieve clock synchronization,
eachWSN node can be equipped with a GPS receiver for accessing
the global time. However, GPS receivers consume excessive power
and may not work in indoor environments. Thus, various WSN
clock synchronization protocols based onmessage exchanges have
been developed. Different from the above synchronization-based
approach, the synchronization-free approach uses the gatewaywith
a globally synchronized clock to timestamp the data upon the ar-
rival of the corresponding network packet. However, in multi-hop
WSNs, this synchronization-free approach may perform unsatis-
factorily, because the data delivery on each hop may have uncer-
tain delays due to various factors such as channel contention among
nodes.
Differently, the synchronization-free approach is desirable for
uplink data timestamping in LoRaWANs. Reasons are two-fold. First,
in contrast to the multi-hop WSNs, LoRaWANs adopt a one-hop
gateway-centered star topology that is free of the issue of hop-wise
uncertain delays. Specifically, as the radio signal propagation times
from the end devices to the gateway are generally in microseconds,
the LoRaWAN frame arrival time instant can well represent the
time instant that the frame leaves the end device. As a result, times-
tamping the uplink data at the gateway canmeet the timestamping
accuracy requirements of many real-world applications. Second, if
the synchronization-based approach is adopted otherwise, the task
of keeping the end devices’ clocks synchronized and the inclusion
of timestamps in the LoRaWAN data frames will introduce consid-
erable overhead to the narrowband LoRaWANs. Given the above
reasons, the synchronization-free approach of timestamping the
uplink data at the gateway is lightweight, implementation-friendly,
and efficient due to its simplicity.
Despite the prospect of the synchronization-free approach ow-
ing to its low overhead, in this paper, we take an adversary perspec-
tive to examine this approach under the LoRaWAN context and
seek to improve its security. This is because that wrong timestamp-
ing can also lead to undesirable consequences. The long-range com-
munication capability of LoRaWAN, though increasing connectiv-
ity, renders the communications susceptible towireless attacks that
can be launched from remote and hidden sites. The LoRaWAN
specifications only define conventional frame confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and device authentication measures. These conventional
security measures may be inadequate to protect the network from
wireless attacks on the physical (PHY) layer of LoRaWAN.
In this paper, we consider a basic threat of frame delay attack de-
scribed in the RFC 7384 [15] that will subvert the synchronization-
free uplink data timestamping approach. Our experiments based
on a commodity LoRaWAN platform show that there is a time
window of tens of milliseconds (ms) after the onset of a legiti-
mate frame transmission for implementing stealthy jamming. The
jammed victim gateway cannot decode any frame and raises no
alerts to the operating system (OS). The lengthy timewindowmakes
the stealthy jamming easily achievable using commodity LoRa de-
vices. Based on the above, we have implemented the frame delay
attack through a combination of stealthy jamming and frame re-
play that can introduce arbitrary delays to the deliveries of Lo-
RaWAN frames.1 This will subvert the synchronization-free data
timestamping approach that assumes near-zero signal propagation
times. As the attack does not breach frame integrity, it cannot be
solved by cryptographic protection and conventional securitymea-
sures such as frame counting.
To address the above attack, we explore the LoRaWAN trans-
mitters’ traits that can be extracted from their transmitted signals.
A recent study [8] exploited the LoRaWAN transmitters’ distinct
frequency biases (FBs) in generating the chirps to disentangle col-
liding frames. The biases are mainly caused by the manufactur-
ing imperfections of the transmitters’ internal oscillators. Inspired
by this, we inquire whether the replay step of the frame delay at-
tack introduces extra detectable FBs. Different from [8] that only
needs a coarse-grained analysis to detect multiple peaks in the fre-
quency domain, we will need high-precision FB estimation to de-
tect a small extra FB introduced by the malicious replayer.
To this end, we propose a SoftLoRa gateway that integrates a
low-power software-defined radio (SDR) receiver [2] with a com-
modity LoRaWAN gateway to capture and analyze the received ra-
dio signals. Comparedwith an alternative solution of using a single
full-fledged SDR transceiver such as USRP to demodulate and ana-
lyze the received signals in software, our SoftLoRa gateway is ad-
vantageous in its efficient hard-speed demodulation while its SDR
receiver is used for defense only. Based on LoRa’s Chirp Spread
Spectrum (CSS) modulationmethod, we develop a set of signal pro-
cessing algorithms for SoftLoRa to estimate the FB. From our ex-
periments with 16 LoRaWAN end devices, we show that (i) with a
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of down to –25 dB, SoftLoRa
achieves a resolution of 120Hz in estimating the transmitter’s FB,
which is just 0.14 parts-per-million (ppm) of the channel’s central
frequency of 869.75MHz; (ii) the frame replay by a USRP intro-
duces an additional FB of at least 543Hz (i.e., 0.62 ppm), exceeding
SoftLoRa’s FB estimation resolution of 0.14 ppm. Thus, SoftLoRa
can track FB to detect the replay step of the frame delay attack.
Note that the detection does not require uniqueness or distinc-
tiveness of LoRaWAN end devices’ FBs, because it detects the FB
1Two computer science undergraduate students have also implemented the attack
with light instructions from us and documented their results in their dissertations
[25, 28]. With the information provided in this paper, skillful attackers can easily re-
implement the attack.
changes caused by the replay, rather than identifies the transmit-
ter.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We implement a stealthy frame delay attack with quantified
parameter ranges against a commodity LoRaWAN platform,
alerting to the insecurity of any system functions that rely
on timely delivery of frames such as the gateway’s uplink
data timestamping.
• We design time-domain signal processing algorithms for ac-
curately estimating LoRaWAN end devices’ FBs. The FB esti-
mation requires accurate timestamping of the signal arrival.
We achieve microseconds signal timestamping accuracy, im-
proving our understanding on the timestamping accuracy
for narrowband LoRaWAN signals and also echoing the re-
sults in [18] that are obtained using a different approach.
• With the accurate FB estimation, our SoftLoRa gateway can
reliably detect the frame delay attack. The SoftLoRa gate-
way enables an attack-aware lightweight approach to times-
tamping the data generated by LoRaWAN end devices that
run little or even no code for timestamping. The simplicity,
low overhead, and attack awareness are highly desired in
real-world systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. §2 reviews related
work. §3 details the synchronization-free data timestamping in Lo-
RaWANs. §4 studies the frame delay attack. §5 presents the Soft-
LoRa gateway design. §6 develops the microseconds-accurate sig-
nal timestamping needed by FB estimation. §7 studies LoRa’s FB
and uses it to counteract the frame delay attack. §8 presents the
results of the experiments in real environments. §9 concludes this
paper.
2 RELATED WORK
The communication performance of LoRaWAN has received in-
creasing research. A theoretical capacity analysis for LoRaWAN
is presented in [14]. LoRaWAN’s communication performance is
profiled via field measurements [13, 17, 26]. Marcelis et al. [13]
propose a coding scheme for data recovery. The Choir system [8]
exploits the diverse FBs of the LoRaWANend devices to decode col-
liding frames from different end devices. However, it does not de-
velop an FB estimation algorithm. The Charm system [7] exploits
coherent combining to decode a frame from the weak signals re-
ceived bymultiple geographically distributed LoRaWAN gateways.
It allows the LoRaWAN end device to use a lower transmission
power. Several recent studies [11, 16, 24, 27] have devised various
backscatter designs for LoRa to reduce the power consumption of
end devices. However, all these existing studies focus on under-
standing and improving the data communication performance of
LoRaWAN [7, 8, 13, 13, 14, 17, 26], or reducing power consump-
tion via backscattering [11, 16, 24, 27]. None of them specifically
addresses efficient data timestamping, a basic system function of
many LoRaWAN-based systems.
LongShoT [18] is an approach to synchronize the LoRaWANend
devices with the gateway. Through low-level offline time profil-
ing for a LoRaWAN radio chip (e.g., to measure the time delays
between hardware interrupts and the chip’s power consumption
rise), LongShoT achieves sub-50microseconds accuracy. LongShoT
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is designed for the LoRaWAN systems requiring tight clock syn-
chronization. Differently, we address data timestamping and fo-
cus on the less stringent but more commonly seen milliseconds or
sub-second accuracy requirements. Moreover, as we will discuss
in §3.2, the timestamping approach based on the prior clock syn-
chronization will introduce considerable overhead. If highly accu-
rate (e.g., microseconds accuracy) timestamping is not needed, it is
wise to adopt the synchronization-free approach with the security
enhancement presented in this paper.
Security of LoRaWANhas received limited research. In [4], Aras
et al. discuss several possible attacks against LoRa, including key
compromise, frame replay, and jamming. The first two attacks need
prior physical attacks such as memory extraction and node reset.
Their jamming simply aims at subverting the victim receiver’s frame
decoding. In this paper, we additionally examine the timing of the
jamming such that the victim gateway does not alert the OS. In [5],
a selective jamming attack against certain receivers and/or certain
application frames is studied. From our results in §4.3, the selective
jamming in [5] cannot be stealthy because it cannot start jamming
until the frame header is decoded. As a result, the selective jam-
ming will corrupt the payload, leading to integrity check failures
and alerts. In [20], Robyns et al. apply deep learning for LoRa trans-
mitter identification based on the received baseband signal. Their
approach can only identify the source transmitter as one of the
considered transmitters that the trained deep model captures. It
cannot be used to detect the malicious replayer that is in general
out of the deep model.
3 DATA TIMESTAMPING IN LORAWAN
3.1 LoRaWAN Primer
LoRa is a PHY layer technique that adopts a CSS modulation and
works in ISM bands (e.g., US 915MHz and EU 868MHz). LoRaWAN
is an open data link specification based on LoRa. A LoRaWAN is
a star network consisting of a number of end devices and a gate-
way that is often connected to the Internet. Gateways are often
equipped with GPS receivers for time keeping. The transmission
direction from the end device to the gateway is called uplink and
the opposite is called downlink. LoRaWAN defines three classes for
end devices, i.e., Class A, B and C. In Class A, each communication
session must be initiated by an uplink transmission. There are two
subsequent downlink windows. Class A end devices can sleep to
save energy when there are no pending data to transmit. Class A
adopts the ALOHA media access control protocol. Class B extends
Class A with additional scheduled downlink windows. However,
such scheduled downlink windows will require the end devices to
have synchronized clocks, incurring considerable overhead as we
will analyze shortly. Class C requires the end devices to be in the
listening mode all the time. Clearly, Class C is not for low-power
IoT objects. In this paper, we focus on the energy-efficient Class
A, because it is supported by all commodity LoRaWAN platforms.
To the best of our knowledge, no commodity LoRaWAN platforms
have out-of-the-box support for Class B – the system developers
will need to engineer the needed clock synchronization first.
3.2 Sync-Based vs. Sync-Free Timestamping
Data timestamping, i.e., to record the time of interest in terms of
wall clock that is meaningful to the data, is a basic system func-
tion required by the monitoring data collection applications based
on LoRaWAN. For a sensor measurement, the time of interest is
the time instant when the measurement is taken by the end device.
WSNs largely adopt the synchronization-based approach. Specifi-
cally, the clocks of the WSN nodes are synchronized to the global
time using some clock synchronization protocol. Then, each WSN
node can timestamp the data using its local clock. WSNs have to
adopt this approach due primarily to that the multi-hop data deliv-
eries from the WSN nodes to the gateway in general suffer uncer-
tain time delays. Thus, although the clock synchronization intro-
duces additional complexity to the system design, it has become
a standard component for systems requiring data timestamping.
However, in LoRaWANs with much less communication capacity
due to their narrowband nature, the overhead of the clock synchro-
nization cannot be ignored.
Now, we present an example to illustrate. Assume we have a
microseconds or milliseconds accurate clock synchronization ap-
proach for LoRaWAN. Typical crystal oscillators found in micro-
controllers and personal computers have drift rates of 30 to 50
ppm [10]. Without loss of generality, we adopt 40 ppm for the fol-
lowing calculation. Under this drift rate, an end device will need
14 synchronization sessions per hour to ensure a sub-10ms clock
error. These synchronization sessions may represent a significant
communication overhead for an end device. For instance, in Eu-
rope, a LoRaWAN end device adopting a spreading factor of 12
can only send 24 30-byte frames per hour to conform to the 1%
duty cycle requirement specified by The European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute [12]. Although the synchronization
information may be piggybacked to the data frames as in [18],
a low-rate monitoring application may have to send the frames
more frequently just to satisfy the time keeping requirement. In
addition, the timestamps for data records also occupy frame pay-
load space. For instance, if each frame with 30-byte payload con-
tains a eight-byte timestamp [18] for the data in the frame, 27% of
the effective bandwidth is used to convey timestamps. From the
above example, we can see that the clock synchronization service
and the data timestamps may consume a significant fraction of Lo-
RaWAN’s communication capacity.
In this paper,we consider a synchronization-free approach. Specif-
ically, a LoRaWAN end device still records the times of interest in
terms of its unsynchronized clock. Right before sending a number
of data records using a frame, the device replaces the the records’
times of interest in its local clock with their elapsed times up to
the present, form the frame, and transmit it immediately. We as-
sume that the buffer time from the generation to the transmission
of the data records is short to ensure limited local clock drift and
limited bits to represent the elapsed times. For instance, to enforce
an upper bound of 10ms clock drift under a drift rate of 40 ppm,
the buffer time needs to be within 4.1 minutes. As a result, 18
bits will be sufficient to represent an elapsed time with 1ms res-
olution. Since the one-hop signal propagation time from the end
device to the gateway is negligible for millisecond-level systems,
the gateway can easily reconstruct the global timestamps based
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on the frame arrival time and the elapsed times contained in the
frame. Compared with the synchronization-based approach, this
synchronization-free approach avoids the communication overhead
and implementation complexity caused by clock synchronization.
It can also reduce the frame payload use for time information (e.g.,
18 bits for elapsed time versus 8 bytes for complete timestamp). In
particular, if the end device can immediately transmit any newly
generated sensor/event data, the elapsed time payload is even not
needed.
The synchronization-free approach is lightweight and commen-
surate with LoRaWAN’s scarce communication resources. Its accu-
racy can be affected by (1) the delay from the end device’s appli-
cation code requesting frame transmission to the actual emission
of radio signal by the LoRaWAN chip and (2) the gateway’s accu-
racy in timestamping the radio signal arrival. An existing study [9]
shows that these issues cause a sum uncertainty of about 3ms only.
By resorting to lower-level accesses to the radio chip such as in
[18], the uncertaintywill be further reduced. Thus, the synchronization-
free approach can achieve ms or sub-ms timestamping accuracy.
4 SECURITY OF SYNCHRONIZATION-FREE
TIMESTAMPING
The synchronization-free approach brings various benefits includ-
ing implementation simplicity and bandwidth usage saving. Due
to the broadcast and long-range nature of LoRaWAN communi-
cations, it is also important to investigate the security aspect. In
this section, we consider a frame delay attack that maliciously ma-
nipulates the propagation time. Thus, the attack will directly af-
fect the synchronization-free timestamping approach that assumes
near-zero signal propagation time. In this section, §4.1 defines the
threat model; §4.2 presents the implementation of the attack; §4.3
experimentally investigates several important parameter settings
to implement the attack; §4.4 discusses a simple attack detection
approach and its shortcomings.
4.1 Frame Delay Attack
If an adversary introduces a malicious time delay to the deliveries
of the uplink frames from end nodes, the timestamps generated by
the gateway will be compromised. We formally define the threat
model as follows.
Definition 1 (Frame delay attack). The end device and gate-
way are not corrupted by the adversary. However, the adversary may
delay the deliveries of the uplink frames from end nodes. The ma-
licious delay for any frame is finite. Moreover, the frame cannot be
tampered with because of cryptographic protection.
4.2 Implementation of Frame Delay Attack
This section presents a practical implementation of the frame delay
attack via a combination of jamming and replay. §4.2.1 presents the
implementation principle; §4.2.2 discusses several practical issues
in implementing the attack.
4.2.1 Implementation principle. Fig. 1 illustrates the attack imple-
mentation. The adversary sets up twomalicious devices called eaves-
dropper and replayer that are close to the end device and the gate-
way, respectively, to delay the delivery of the uplink frame. The
GatewayEnd device
Eavesdropper
Inject delay 
and replay
Replayer
Stealthy
jamming
Transfer
Uplink
Record
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Figure 1: Implementing frame delay attack by stealthy jam-
ming and replay.
attack consists of three steps. ❶ At the beginning, both the eaves-
dropper and the replayer listen to the LoRa communication chan-
nel between the end device and the gateway. Once the replayer de-
tects an uplink frame transmission from the end device to the gate-
way, it jams the gateway’s frame reception by transmitting a jam-
ming frame. In §4.3, we will investigate experimentally a stealthy
jamming method such that the victim gateway based on an off-the-
shelf LoRa radio does not raise any warning message to the appli-
cation layer. Meanwhile, once the eavesdropper detects an uplink
frame transmission from the end device to the gateway, it records
the radio waveform of the frame. Note that the replayer may prop-
erly control the transmission power of the jamming such that the
jamming frame can jam the victim gateway, while not corrupting
the radio waveform recorded by the eavesdropper. When the re-
player is far away from the eavesdropper, delicate transmission
power control of the replayer may be waived because the jamming
signal will be weak at the eavesdropper after propagation atten-
uation. This is experimentally demonstrated in §8. ❷ The eaves-
dropper sends the recorded radio waveform data to the replayer.
❸ After a time duration of τ seconds from the onset time of the
legitimate frame transmission, the replayer replays the recorded
radio waveform received from the eavesdropper. The above jam-
and-replay process does not need to decipher the payload of the
recorded frame; it simply re-transmits the recorded radio wave-
form. As the gateway is unaware of the earlier jamming and the
integrity of the replayed frame is preserved, the gateway will ac-
cept the replayed frame even if it checks the cryptographically pro-
tected check sum and frame counter. The above process introduces
a delay of τ seconds to the delivery of the frame.
Although the above descriptions focus on an end device, the
attack setup illustrated in Fig. 1 can affect the uplink frames from
many end devices close to the eavesdropper, as long as the strength
of the signal from an end device at the eavesdropper ismuch higher
than that of the jamming signal from the replayer.
4.2.2 Several practical issues. To increase the stealthiness of the
replay attack, the replayer can well control the transmission power
of the replay such that only the victim gateway can receive the
replayed frame. Although the volume of the recorded radio wave-
form data is often large, the eavesdropper can transmit the data to
the jammer via a separate communication link (e.g., LTE).
As the adversary should delay the uplink frame, how does the
adversary know in time the direction of the current transmission?
In LoRaWAN, the uplink preamble uses up chirps, whereas the
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effective attack window
time
Figure 2: Jamming attack time window.
downlink preamble uses down chirps. Thus, the adversary can quickly
detect the direction of the current transmission within a chirp time.
From our results in §4.3, the jamming should start after several
chirps and before tens of chirps of the frame transmission. Thus, a
time duration of one chirp for sensing the direction of the transmis-
sion will not impede the timeliness of the jamming. And the end
device identification can be achieved by using the uplink frame’s
source node ID (if not encrypted) or extracting the end device’s
frequency trait (see §7.2).
4.3 Attack Experiments
We conduct experiments to investigate the parameter settings for
implementing the stealthy jamming attack. In the experiments, we
set up two RN2483-based LoRa nodes as the end device and the
gateway. We use a third LoRa node as the jammer. The distance
between the gateway and the end device is about 5m; the distance
between the jammer and the gateway is about 1m. We primarily
investigate the timing of successful stealthy jamming. From our
experiments, there are three critical time windows (denoted by w1,
w2 , and w3) after the onset time of the legitimate frame transmis-
sion from the end device to the gateway (denoted by t0). These time
windows are illustrated in Fig. 2. If the onset time of the jamming
is in [t0, t0 + w1], the gateway most likely receives the jamming
frame from the jammer only; if it is in [t0 + w1 , t0 + w2], the gate-
way can receive neither frames and the gateway’s RN2483 raises
no alerts; if it is in [t0 +w2 , t0 +w3], the RN2483 reports frame cor-
ruption; if it is after t0 + w3, the gateway can receive both frames
sequentially. Therefore, the time window [t0 +w1, t0 +w2] is called
effective attack window. The jamming attack with an onset time in
this window is stealthy to the gateway.
Wemeasurew1,w2 , andw3 under various settings for the spread-
ing factor and the payload size of the legitimate frame. Table 1 sum-
marizes the results. From the results for w1, the jamming should
start after the 5th chirp of the legitimate frame transmission. This
is because: i) the gateway’s LoRa chip has not locked the legitimate
preamble until the 6th chirp and it will re-lock the jamming frame’s
preamble due to higher signal strength if the jamming frame starts
before the 5th chirp of the legitimate frame; ii) the gateway’s LoRa
chip locks the legitimate preamble from the 6th chirp and will sim-
ply drop any received radio data without reporting any error if
any of the last three chirps (i.e., the 6th, 7th, and 8th chirps) of
the preamble and/or the frame header are corrupted. For the latter
case of frame header corruption, the hardware cannot determine
whether itself is the intended recipient and therefore drops the re-
ceived data. Thus, the stealthy jamming should start after the 5th
chirp of the legitimate frame transmission.
We can also see thatw2 increases exponentially with the spread-
ing factor. This is because: i) the total time for transmitting the pre-
amble and frame header increases exponentially with the spread-
ing factor; ii) corruption of the payload after the frame header will
lead to an integrity check error and a warning message. The w3
Table 1: Jamming attack time windows for RN2483.
Spreading Chirp Preamble Payload w1 w2 w3
factor S time time (byte)
10 5 28 141
7 1.024 8.2 20 5 38 156
30 6 41 165
40 6 54 178
7 1.024 8.2 6 41 165
8 2.048 16.4 30 10 82 208
9 4.096 32.8 22 156 274
* Unit for chirp time, preamble time, w1 , w2, w3 is millisecond.
is roughly the time for transmitting the legitimate frame. Thus, if
the jamming onset time is after t0 +w3 , both the legitimate and the
jamming frames can be decoded.
The above experiments show that, there is a time window for
the jamming to corrupt the preamble partially and the frame header
such that the victim simply drops the received data and raises no
alerts. Jamming starting in this window is stealthy.
4.4 Discussion on a Simple Attack Detector
A simple attack detection approach is to perform round-trip tim-
ing and then compare the measured round-trip time with a thresh-
old. However, this approach will need a downlink transmission
for each uplink transmission, which doubles the communication
overhead. LoRaWAN is mainly designed and optimized for uplinks.
For instance, a LoRaWAN gateway can receive frames from multi-
ple end devices simultaneously using different spreading factors,
whereas it can send a single downlink frame only at a time. This
is because Class A specification requires that any downlink trans-
mission must be unicast, in response to a precedent uplink trans-
mission [22]. Thus, the round-trip timing approachmatches poorly
with the uplink-downlink asymmetry characteristic of LoRaWAN.
Moreover, as the frame delay attacks will be rare events, continu-
ally using downlink acknowledgements to preclude the threat is
a low cost-effective solution. Differently, in this paper, we will de-
sign advanced signal processing algorithms that run at the gate-
way to analyze the received radio signals and detect the frame de-
lay attack. Our technique will be a cost-effective solution for the
awareness of the attack existence without introducing any commu-
nication overhead or any modifications to the hardware/software
of the end devices.
5 SoftLoRa GATEWAY
This section presents the SoftLoRa gateway used to achieve secure
data timestamping in LoRaWANs.
5.1 SoftLoRa Hardware
To develop the attack detection capability, we integrate an SDR
receiver with a LoRaWAN radio to monitor the LoRa PHY layer.
Various cheap (US$25 only [2]) and low-power SDR receivers are
widely available now. In this paper, we use RTL-SDR USB dongles
based on the RTL2832Uchipset [2],whichwere originally designed
5
Raspberry Pi
LoRaWAN
shield
LoRa anteenna
868 MHz
RTL-SDR 
USB dongle
LoRaWAN
chip
Figure 3: SoftLoRa hard-
ware prototype consisting
of Raspberry Pi (host),
LoRaWAN shield (LoRa
transceiver), RTL-SDR USB
dongle (SDR receiver).
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tom part is end device; up-
per part is the gateway; solid
arrows are local data flows;
dashed arrows are transmis-
sions.
to be DVB-T TV tuners. The RTL-SDR supports continuous tun-
ing in the range of [24, 1766] MHz, which covers the LoRaWAN
bands (i.e., 430, 433, 868, 915 MHz). It can operate at 2.4Msps re-
liably for extended time periods. Thus, the sampling resolution is
1/2.4Msps = 0.42µs.
The research of this paper is conducted based on a SoftLoRa
hardware prototype that integrates a Raspberry Pi 3Model B single-
board computer (as the host), a Cooking Hacks LoRaWAN shield
[1] (as the LoRa transceiver), and an RTL-SDR USB dongle (as the
SDR receiver). Fig. 3 shows the prototype. The LoRaWAN shield
consists of a Microchip RN2483 chipset, an 868MHz antenna, and
a general-purpose input/output (GPIO) interfacing circuit. RN2483
is based on Semtech SX1276, a major commodity LoRa chip on
the current market. Mounted on the host via GPIO pins, the shield
can be controlled using a C++ library from Cooking Hacks. An
868MHz antenna is also integrated with the RTL-SDR to improve
signal reception. The RTL-SDR is plugged into a USB port of the
gateway’s host computer.
The SDR receiver will be used to capture the radio signal over a
time duration of the first two CSS chirps of an uplink frame. The
first sampled chirp is used to extract PHY-layer timestamp (cf. §6),
whereas the second sampled chirp is used to extract the FB of the
transmitter (cf. §7). The microseconds-accurate PHY-layer times-
tamp is a prerequisite of the FB estimation. As only two chirps’
radio waveform will be analyzed, SoftLoRa will have manageable
computation overhead, which can be performed by embedded com-
puting boards such as Raspberry Pi.
An alternative approach is to adopt a full-fledged SDR transceiver
(e.g., USRP) to design a highly customized LoRaWANgatewaywith
PHY signal analysis capability. However, this approach will lose
the factory-optimized hardware-speed LoRa demodulation built in
the commodity LoRaWAN platforms. Moreover, full-fledged SDR
transceivers (e.g., USRP N210) are often 10x more expensive than
ADC
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Figure 5: Analog signal processing in SDR receiver.
SoftLoRa. The low-cost, low-power, listen-only RTL-SDR suffices
for developing the frame delay attack detector.
5.2 CSS Reception using SDR Receiver
This section models the LoRa signal reception using the SDR re-
ceiver. It will be a basis for understanding the challenges of achiev-
ing PHY-layer timestamping in §6 and developing accurate FB es-
timation algorithms in §7.
LoRa adopts CSS modulation. A chirp is a finite-time band-pass
signal with time-varying frequency that swaps the whole band-
width of the communication channel in a linear or non-linear man-
ner. Let A(t) and f (t) denote the instantaneous amplitude and fre-
quency of the chirp at the time instant t. Thus, the chirp, denoted
by s(t), is
s(t) = A(t) sin
(
2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx + θTx
)
,
where θTx ∈ [0, 2pi) is the LoRa transmitter’s phase that is usually
unknown.
Fig. 5 illustrates the essential analog signal processing steps of
most SDR receivers to yield the in-phase (I ) and quadrature (Q)
components of the received radio signal. The SDR receiver gener-
ates two unit-amplitude orthogonal carriers sin(2pifct + θRx) and
cos(2pifct + θRx), where fc is a specified frequency and θRx is the
phase of the two self-generated carriers. The fc can be set to be the
central frequency of the used LoRa channel. The I and Q compo-
nents, denoted by sI (t) and sQ(t), are
sI (t) =s(t) · sin(2pifct + θRx)
=
A(t)
2
(
cos
(
2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx–2pifc t+θTx–θRx
)
(1)
– cos
(
2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx + 2pifct + θTx + θRx
))
, (2)
sQ (t) =s(t) · cos (2pifct + θRx)
=
A(t)
2
(
sin
(
2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx–2pifct+θTx–θRx
)
(3)
+ sin
(
2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx + 2pifct + θTx + θRx
))
, (4)
The high-frequency components in Eqs. (2) and (4) are removed
by the low-pass filters of the SDR receiver. Thus, the I and Q com-
ponents after the filtering, denoted by I (t) and Q(t), are given by
6
Eqs. (1) and (3). They can be rewritten as
I (t) =
A(t)
2
cosΘ(t), Q(t) =
A(t)
2
sinΘ(t),
Θ(t) = 2pi
∫ t
0
f (x)dx – 2pifct + θ, θ = θTx – θRx.
The continuous-time I (t) and Q(t) are then sampled by the analog-
to-digital converters (ADCs) to yield the I and Q data. For sim-
plicity of exposition, the analysis in this paper is performed in the
continuous-time domain.
5.3 SoftLoRa Software Architecture
This section overviews the software architecture of SoftLoRa to
achieve secure data timestamping that is resilient to the frame de-
lay attack. It is based on the results in the subsequent sections of
this paper.
The upper part of Fig. 4 shows the software architecture of the
SoftLoRa. The uplink transmission from the end device is captured
by both the gateway’s LoRaWAN transceiver and the SDR receiver.
The LoRaWAN transceiver demodulates the received radio signal
and passes the frame to the gateway’s computer host. PHY-layer
signal processing algorithms are applied on the LoRa signal after
down-conversion by the SDR receiver to pick precisely the arrival
time of the radio signal (i.e., PHY timestamping), estimate the trans-
mitter’s FB, and detect whether the current frame is a replayed one.
The replay detection is by checking whether the estimated FB is
consistent with the historical biases associated with the transmit-
ter ID claimed in the current frame. The gateway will be aware of
such frame replay attack and drop the replayed frame. Note that
SoftLoRa gateway uses the SDR receiver to obtain FBs, rather than
to decode the frame.
In this rest of this paper, we will present the signal processing
algorithms for PHY signal timestamping in §6, FB estimation and
attack detection in §7. Note that microseconds-accurate PHY sig-
nal timestamping is a prerequisite of the FB estimation.
6 SIGNAL TIMESTAMPING FOR LORA
In this section, we present our LoRa signal timestamping approach
on SoftLoRa (§6.1) and evaluation results (§6.2). We aim to achieve
microseconds accuracy in timestamping the LoRa signal.
6.1 LoRa Signal Timestamping using SDR
Receiver
We perform PHY-layer signal timestamping by detecting the onset
time of LoRa frame preamble. With preamble onset timestamp, the
FB estimation algorithm can select the right segments of I and Q
data to work on. In this section, we first model the preamble’s I and
Q data received by the SDR receiver and then discuss the preamble
onset time detection.
6.1.1 Preamble received by SDR receiver. In LoRaWAN, by default,
the preamble of an uplink frame (from end device to gateway) or
a downlink frame (from gateway to end device) consists of eight
up or down linear chirps, respectively [22]. Let fc andW represent
the central frequency and bandwidth of the used LoRa channel.
In all numerical examples and experiments of this paper, we use
a LoRaWAN channel with fc = 869.75MHz and W = 125 kHz
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[22]. The instantaneous frequency of an up chirp increases lin-
early with time, from the lowest frequency (i.e., fc – W /2) to the
highest frequency (i.e., fc + W /2) of the channel. It is given by
f (t) = W
2
2S ·t–
W
2 +fc for t ∈
[
0, 2
S
W
]
, where S is the spreading factor
and 2
S
W is the chirp time. The S is an integer within [6, 12]. A larger
spreading factor increases the chirp time and thus decreases the
data rate when the chirps are used to encode data. However, longer
chirp times increase the SNR at the receiver and thus the commu-
nication range. By following the analysis in §5.2, the I and Q com-
ponents of the received up chirp are given by I (t) = A(t)2 cosΘ(t)
and Q(t) = A(t)2 sinΘ(t), where the instantaneous angle Θ(t) is
Θ(t) = piW
2
2S t
2 – piWt + θ. The analysis for the down chirp with
linearly decreasing frequency is similar; we do not elaborate here.
Fig. 6 shows the I data and the spectrogram of an ideal up chirp
sampled at 2.4Msps. The parameters of the up chirp are A(t) = 2,
θ = 0, and S = 7. Thus, the chirp time 2
S
W is 1.024ms. To gener-
ate the spectrogram, we apply the short-time fast Fourier trans-
form (FFT) with 2S-point Kaiser window and 16-point overlap be-
tween two neighbor windows. Thus, the spectrogram consists of
20 power spectral densities over the chirp time of 1.024ms.
6.1.2 Preamble onset time detection. Detecting the onset time of
the preamble is non-trivial. To understand the challenges, in this
section, we discuss two possiblemethods and their inefficacy. Then,
we present two other promising methods.
As the up chirp exhibits a clear time-frequency pattern as shown
in Fig. 6, a possible approach to locating the first up chirp of the
preamble is to analyze the spectrogram of the received I and Q
data. However, the spectrogram inevitably has reduced time reso-
lution. For instance, the time resolution of the spectrogram in Fig. 6
is 1024µs/20 ≈ 50µs, which impedes high-resolution PHY-layer
timestamping.
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Figure 9: Preamble onset time detection results.
Matched filter is a widely adopted symbol detection technique
for constant carrier frequency modulation schemes, e.g., ASK and
PSK. As a coherent detection technique, the matched filter requires
that the receiver is phase-locked to the transmitter (i.e., θ = 0)
to achieve the best symbol detection accuracy. However, as LoRa
adopts time-varying frequency, it is difficult for the SDR receiver to
estimate the transmitter’s phase θTx. In fact, low-end SDR receivers
such as the RTL-SDR used in this work do not provide phase-lock
capability. As a result, the phase difference θ, which is a critical
factor affecting the shape of I (t) and Q(t), will be random. Fig. 7
shows the ideal I (t) traces of the up chirp when the θ is 0 and pi.
The waveform shapes are different. Thus, it is impossible to define
a template shape for the matched filter to work. Moreover, as ana-
lyzed in §7, the FB of the LoRa transmitter will significantly alter
the shapes of the I and Q signals. Fig. 8 shows the actual I trace
captured by the SDR receiver. The dip center shift is caused by
FB. Thus, due to the random θ and the LoRa transceiver’s FB, the
matched filter is not promising.
To investigate the signal timestamping of LoRa, we consider two
time-domain signal processing techniques:
Envelope detector: First, we apply the Hilbert transform to ex-
tract the amplitude envelope of the I or Q signal. Then, the sample
with the largest ratio between its envelope amplitude and the pre-
vious sample’s envelope amplitude is yielded as the preamble on-
set. Fig. 9(a) shows the extracted amplitude envelope and the ratio
curve over time. We can see that the maximum ratio well indicates
the onset time of the preamble.
AIC detector: The autoregressive Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) algorithm [21] has been widely adopted to estimate the ar-
rival time of seismic wave with an accuracy of a single sampling
point. As the I and Q signals are similar to the seismic waves, the
AIC is a promising solution for our problem. The algorithm works
as follows. For each point of the signal as an onset time candidate,
two autoregressive models are constructed for the signal segments
before and after the onset time candidate. The candidate that gives
the largest dissimilarity between the two autoregressive models is
yielded as the final onset time estimate. The vertical line in Fig. 9(b)
represents the onset time detected by the AIC detector.
Note that as both the envelope detector and the AIC detector
formulate the onset time detection as optimization problems, they
do not need any detection threshold.
Table 2: Error upper bound (µs) by envelope (ENV) detector
and AIC.
E
N
V I error 5.4 4.5 4.8 5.2 1.9 5.2 4.6 3.5 6.3 5.2
Q error 6.3 6.7 5.6 7.3 7.1 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.2 9.8
A
IC I error 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.9
Q error 1.5 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
T
im
es
ta
m
p
in
g
er
ro
r
(µ
s)
SNR (dB)
Figure 10: AIC timestamping error vs. received SNR.
6.2 Signal Timestamping Accuracy Evaluation
We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the accuracy of our
PHY-layer signal timestamping. The accuracy of signal timestamp-
ing is restricted by the sampling rate of the SDR. When the real
onset time is between two consequent samples, the real onset time
is unknown while the range can be confirmed. Thus, we use the
upper bound of the signal timestamping error to evaluate our ap-
proach. In §8, we will also measure this error metric in a multi-
story building and a campus, where the signal propagation will be
affected by the noise and the attenuation with distance.
Tables 2 shows the error upper bound ∆2 measured for the en-
velope detector and the AIC detector when operating on the I and
Q data in ten experiments, respectively. We can see that the AIC
detector achieves higher accuracy. In particular, the timing errors
of the AIC detector are less than 2µs.
Then, we evaluate the impact of random noises on AIC’s sig-
nal timestamping accuracy. We artificially add zero-mean Gauss-
ian noises to the collected high-SNR I and Q traces. Then, we ap-
ply the AIC detector on the noise-added traces to detect the LoRa
signal onset time. The SNR in dB is defined as 10 log10
signal power
noise power .
Fig. 10 shows the results. From our measurements in a multistory
building (cf. §8), the received SNR ranges from 13 dB to –1 dB. From
Fig. 10, the average timestamping error is expected to be within
20µs. This will be confirmed by real experiments in §8. When the
SNR is –20 dB, which is the lower limit for reliable demodulation
[3], from Fig. 10, the average error will be within 25µs.
7 FREQUENCY BIAS-BASED FRAME DELAY
ATTACK DETECTION
Internal oscillators for generating carriers generally have frequency
biases (FBs) of one to hundreds of ppm, due to manufacturing im-
perfection. This section develops algorithms for estimating LoRa
transmitters’ FBs. We also investigate whether such FBs can be
used to detect the replay attacks.
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7.1 FB Estimation
This section describes algorithms for estimating the transmitter’s
FB based on an up chirp in the preamble. The method for a down
chirp is similar. First, we analyze the impact of the transmitter’s
and SDR receiver’s FBs (denoted by δTx and δRx) on the I and Q
traces. The up chirp’s instantaneous frequency accounting for δTx
is
f (t) =
W 2
2S
· t –
W
2
+ fc + δTx, t ∈
[
0,
2S
W
]
.
The two local unit-amplitude orthogonal carriers generated by the
SDR receiver are sin(2pi(fc + δRx)t + θRx) and cos(2pi(fc + δRx)t +
θRx). Following the analysis in §5.2, the I and Q components of
the received up chirp can be derived as I (t) = A(t)2 cosΘ(t) and
Q(t) = A(t)2 sinΘ(t), where the instantaneous angle Θ(t) is given
by
Θ(t) =
piW 2
2S
t
2 – piWt + 2piδt + θ, δ = δTx – δRx. (5)
The difference between the transmitter’s and receiver’s FBs, i.e., δ,
affects the I and Q waveforms. Fig. 11 shows the numerical results
of I traces when δ = –25 kHz and δ = +25 kHz. The non-zero δ
shifts the axis of symmetry of the I trace. We observed this in the
actual I data shown in Fig. 8.
For a certain SDR receiver, the FB estimation problem is to es-
timate δ from the captured I and Q traces. We do not need to es-
timate δTx, because for a certain SDR receiver with a nearly fixed
δRx, a change in δ indicates a change in δTx and a replay attack. In
what follows, we describe two approaches based on linear regres-
sion and least squares formulations. The least squares approach
keeps robust when the SNR is very low but has higher computa-
tion overhead.
7.1.1 Linear regression approach. From Eq. (5), the FB δ appears in
the linear item ofΘ(t) only. Thus, theΘ′(t) = Θ(t)– piW
2
2S t
2+piWt is
a linear function of t, i.e., 2piδt + θ. The slope ofΘ′(t), i.e., 2piδ, can
be estimated by linear regression based on the data pairs (t,Θ(t) –
piW 2
2S t
2 + piWt), where t ∈
[
0, 2
S
W
]
, Θ(t) = atan2(Q(t), I (t)) + 2kpi,
and k ∈ Z rectifies the multi-valued inverse tangent function
atan2(·, ·) ∈ (–pi,pi) to an unlimited value domain. The rectifica-
tion is as follows. The k is initialized to be 0 when t = 0. As t in-
creases, if atan2(Q(t), I (t)) jumps from –pi to pi, k decreases by one;
if atan2(Q(t), I (t)) jumps from pi to –pi, k increases by one. Note
that the traces I (t) and Q(t) where t ∈
[
0, 2
S
W
]
are the segments
of the captured I and Q signals starting from the preamble onset
time detected by the AIC algorithm and lasting for a chirp time
duration of 2
S
W seconds.
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Fig. 12 shows the intermediate results of the FB extraction. Fig. 12(a)
shows real I (t) andQ(t) traces of an up chirp emitted by an RN2483-
based LoRa transmitter and captured by the SDR receiver. Fig. 12(b)
shows the atan2(Q(t), I (t)). Fig. 12(c) shows the Θ(t) obtained by
rectifying the result in Fig. 12(b) with 2kpi. Fig. 12(d) shows Θ(t) –
piW 2
2S t
2 +piWt. We can see that it is indeed a linear function of time
t, which conforms to our analysis. By applying linear regression
to the result in Fig. 12(d), the FB δ (i.e., the slope of the fitted line
divided by 2pi) is estimated as –22.8 kHz. Note that the nominal
central frequency is 869.75MHz. The FB is merely 26 ppm of the
central frequency.
We use an SDR receiver to estimate the FBs of 16 RN2483-based
LoRa transmitters. In each test for a LoRa transmitter, the distance
between the transmitter and the SDR receiver is about 5m. The
error bars labeled “original” in Fig. 13 show the results. We can see
that the FBs for a certain node are stable and the nodes generally
have different FBs. The absolute FBs are from 17 kHz to 25 kHz,
which are about 20 ppm to 29 ppmof the nominal central frequency
of 869.75MHz.
Some nodes have similar FBs, e.g., Node 3, 8, and 14. Recall our
discussion in §4.2.1 that the adversary may wish to identify the
nodes based on FBs to selectively attack a certain node. To address
the issue of similar FBs, the adversary may jointly use the FBs
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Figure 14: Frequency estimation error of the least squares-
based approach under different SNRs of the received signal.
and the received signal strengths that are affected by the trans-
mitters’ geographic locations to fingerprint the transmitters. Dif-
ferently, the detection of the replay attack is based on the fact that
the replayed transmission will have a different FB. In other words,
the attack detection does not require distinct FBs among different
transmitters.
As the linear regression approach has a closed-form formula to
compute δ, it has a complexity of O(1) in the search of the δ so-
lution. However, the inverse tangent rectification is susceptible to
low received SNRs. In next section, we present the least squares
approach that still performs well when the received SNR is below
the limit for reliable demodulation, but with a higher complexity
in searching for the δ solution.
7.1.2 Least squares approach. The LoRa signals can be very weak
after long-distance propagation or barrier penetration. The LoRa’s
demodulation is designed to address low SNRs. For Semtech SX1276,
theminimumSNRs required for reliable demodulationwith spread-
ing factors from 7 to 12 are from –7.5 dB to –20 dB [3]. We aim at
extracting FB at comparably lower SNRs. We solve a least squares
problem:
argmin
θ∈[0,2pi),δ
∑
t∈[0,2S/W ]
(Q(t) – A sinΘ(t))2 + (I (t) – A cosΘ(t))2 ,
where Q(t) and I (t) are the received Q and I traces; Θ(t) is given
by Eq. (5); A sinΘ(t) and A cosΘ(t) are the noiseless Q and I tem-
plates. The above formulation requires that the Q and I templates
have an identical and constant amplitude A. From our measure-
ments, this requirement is met when the second chirp of the pream-
ble is used. TheA can be estimated as follows. LetQ(t) = A sinΘ(t)+
ZQ (t) and I (t) = A cosΘ(t) + ZI (t), where ZQ(t) and ZI (t) are zero-
mean random noises in the Q and I traces, respectively. Thus, the
average power of the LoRa signal can be derived asE
[
Q2(t) + I2(t)
]
=
A2+E
[
Z2Q(t) + Z
2
I (t)
]
, whereE
[
Z2Q(t) + Z
2
I (t)
]
is the average noise
power that can be measured when there is no LoRa signal. Thus,
A can be estimated using the average powers of the noisy LoRa
signal and the pure noise.
We use a scipy implementation of the differential evolution al-
gorithm [23] to solve the least squares problem. On the SoftLoRa
platform, it takes 0.69 seconds to solve it. For evaluation, we ar-
tificially add noise traces to the high-SNR Q and I traces used in
§7.1. By controlling the magnitudes of the added noise traces, we
can achieve a certain SNR in dB defined as 10 log10
A2
E
[
Z 2Q (t)+Z
2
I (t)
] .
We use two types of noise traces: randomly generated zero-mean
Gaussian noise traces and real noise traces captured using an SDR
receiver in a multistory building. The amplitudes of the real noise
traces are scaled to achieve different SNRs. From Fig. 14, we can
see that the FB estimation errors are below 120Hz (i.e., 0.14 ppm),
when the SNR is down to –25 dB for both types of noises.
7.2 Replay Attack Detection
The malicious replayer also has an FB. We use a USRP N210 SDR
transceiver to build a replayer. The error bars labeled “replayed”
in Fig. 13 show the FBs estimated from the LoRa signals received
by the SoftLoRa’s SDR receiver when the USRP replays the radio
waveform captured by itself in the experiments presented in §7.1.
Compared with the results labeled “original”, the FBs of the re-
played transmissions are consistently lower. This is because the
USRP has a negative FB. The average additional FBs introduced by
the replayer range from –543 to –743Hz, i.e., 0.62 to 0.85 ppm of
the channel’s central frequency. Thus, with the FB estimation accu-
racy of 0.14 ppm achieved under low SNRs in §7.1.2, the additional
FBs caused by the replay attack can be detected.
Based on the above observation, we describe an approach to reli-
ably detect the replay attacks. We assume that a SoftLoRa gateway
has a database of the FBs of the nodes with which it communi-
cates. This database can be built offline or at run time using its
SDR receiver in the absence of attacks. To address the neighbors’
time-varying radio frequency skews due to run-time conditions
like temperature, the SoftLoRa gateway can continuously update
the database entries based on the FBs estimated from recent frames.
To decide whether the current received frame is a replayed frame,
the SoftLoRa gateway checks whether the FB of the current re-
ceived frame is within the FB range of the claimed source node in
the database. This detection approach is applied after the SoftLoRa
gateway decodes the frame to obtain the claimed source node ID.
The FB estimated from a frame that is detected to be a replayed one
should not be used to update the database. Through the FB moni-
toring, the SoftLoRa gateway can detect the replay attack and will
not use the replayed frame to do data timestamping. Thus, the data
timestamps will not be spoofed by the frame delay attack.
We discuss two notes about the detection mechanism. First, to
bypass the above detectionmechanism, the attacker will need SDRs
with FBs within 0.14 pm (i.e., the SoftLoRa’s FB estimation accu-
racy). However, as RF devices typically have FBs of one to tens of
ppm, it is difficult to bypass the detection mechanism. Second, the
detection does not require uniqueness of the FBs across different
LoRa transceivers, because it is based on changes of FB.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
8.1 Experiments in a Multistory Building
Weconduct experiments in a concrete buildingwith six floors. Along
its long dimension of 190 meters, the building has three sections
and two section junctions. Fig. 15 illustrates a lateral view of the
building. We survey the SNR inside the building. We deploy a fixed
LoRaWAN transmitter in Section A on the 3rd floor, as illustrated
by the triangle in Fig. 15. Then, we carry amobile SoftLoRa receiver
to different positions inside the building to measure the SNR. At
each position, we first profile the noise power and then measure
the total power when the fixed node transmits. We use the method
described in §7.1.2 to compute SNR. In each section, we measure
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floors are not accessible. The triangle indicates the position
of the fixed node. The numbers in the cells are themeasured
timing error upper bounds in µs when the mobile node is at
the corresponding locations.
three positions. The heat map in Fig. 15 shows the SNR measure-
ments. We can see that the SNR decays with the distance between
the two nodes. The SNRs are from –1 dB to 13 dB. Then, we con-
duct the following experiments. Default settings used in our experi-
ments are: spreading factor S = 12; fc = 869.75MHz;W = 125 kHz.
8.1.1 Full implementation of frame delay aack. We deploy a com-
modity LoRaWAN end device and a SoftLoRa gateway in Section
A1 of the 3rd floor and Section C3 of the 6th floor, respectively.
The LoRa signals are significantly attenuated after passing through
multiple building floors. If the end device adopts a spreading factor
of 7, it cannot communicate with the gateway due to the signal at-
tenuation. A minimum spreading factor of 8 is needed for reliable
data communications between them. In rural environments, this
spreading factor can be used to achieve communication ranges of
three to four kilometers [14]. Thus, our multistory building envi-
ronment creates realistic challenges similar to those caused by long
geographic distances. Following the attack scheme in Fig. 1, we de-
ploy two USRP N210 stations as the eavesdropper and the replayer,
next to the end device and the gateway, respectively. We fully im-
plement the attack steps described in §4.2.1. We set the transmis-
sion power of the master to the maximum level, i.e., 15. The trans-
mission power of the jamming signal is 14.1 dBm. After crossing
multiple building levels, the jamming signal arriving at the eaves-
dropper is weak. As a result, when the replayer replays the I and
Q data captured by the eavesdropper that contains the weak jam-
ming signal, the gateway can successfully decode the frame. More-
over, if the replayer’s USRP adopts a transmission power no greater
than 7 dBm, the replayed frame cannot be detected by the gateway,
making the replay attack stealthy to the gateway. This experiment
shows the credibility of the frame delay attack in a building.
8.1.2 Signal timestamping accuracy. Wemeasure the signal times-
tamping error metric defined in §6.2 when the mobile node is at
different locations in the building. Note that this signal timestamp-
ing is a prerequisite of the subsequent FB estimation. The numbers
shown in the cells of Fig. 15 are the measured timestamping error
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Figure 16: Estimated FB vs. transmission power of the end
device. Each box plot shows the minimum, maximum, 25%
and 75% percentiles.
metric in µs when the mobile node is at the corresponding loca-
tions. SoftLoRa achieves sub-10µs signal timestamping accuracy
in a concrete building. These results are consistent with our ear-
lier results in Fig. 10 with SNRs from –1 dB to 13 dB (i.e., the SNR
range in this building).
8.1.3 Impact of transmission power on FB estimation. Fig. 16 shows
the estimated FBs versus the end device’s transmission power un-
der different settings. The bottom row of black box plots are the
FBs estimated by the eavesdropper when the end device transmits
the uplink frame with different transmission powers. The middle
row of red box plots are the FBs estimated by the SoftLoRa gate-
way in the absence of the jamming and replay attacks. Thus, the
FBs estimated by the eavesdropper and the SoftLoRa gateway are
different. This is because that as analyzed in §7.1, the estimated FB
δ contains the transmitter’s and receiver’s FBs δTx and δRx. Note
that the eavesdropper and the SoftLoRa gateway in general have
different FBs. From Fig. 16, the end device’s transmission power
has little impact on the FB estimation.
8.1.4 Additional FB introduced by replayer. In Fig. 16, the top row
of blue box plots are the FBs estimated by the SoftLoRa gateway
when the replayer replays the radio waveform recorded by the
eavesdropper. We set the gain of the replayer’s USRP to be 0 dB.
When the end device adopts a higher transmission power, the re-
played signal also has higher power. By comparing the middle and
the top rows, we can see that the replay attack introduces an addi-
tional FB of about 2 kHz, which is 2.3 ppm of the LoRa channel’s
central frequency. Therefore, the FB monitoring can easily detect
the replay attack. Compared with the results in Fig. 13 showing ad-
ditional FBs of 0.62 to 0.85 ppm, the FBs in this set of experiments
are higher. This is because that here we use two different USRPs
as the eavesdropper and replayer; their FBs are superimposed.
8.2 Long-Distance Experiments in a Campus
We deploy a LoRaWAN end device and a SoftLoRa gateway in a
campus, which are separated by an Euclidean distance of 1.07 km.
The signal’s one-way propagation time is 3.57µs. The end device
and the SoftLoRa gateway are deployed on the roof top of a build-
ing and an open stair case of another building, respectively. Fig. 17(c)
shows the two sites (Site A and B) for deploying the end device and
the SoftLoRa gateway at the campus. Site A is at the roof top of a
11
(a) View Site B from Site A (b) View Site A from Site B
Site A
Site B
1.
07
 K
M
(c) The deployment sites
Figure 17: Pictures taken at the two sites.
building, whereas Site B is in an open stair case of another build-
ing. Fig. 17 shows the pictures taken at the two sites. The circled
construct in a figure is the building where the other site is located
in. We conducted four tests to evaluate the signal timestamping
error. It rained heavily during the tests. The measured error upper
bounds during the four tests are 3.52µs, 2.27µs, 6.43µs, 0.23µs.
We can see that SoftLoRa gateway achieves microseconds signal
timestamping accuracy over a distance of one kilometer. This will
ensure accurate FB estimation.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper considers the security of a synchronization-free data
timestamping approach for LoRaWANs. Specifically, the timestamp-
ing of data is performed by the LoRaWAN gateway based on the
frame arrival time. The low communication overhead of this ap-
proach makes it suitable for the bandwidth-limited LoRaWANs for
collecting low-rate data from geographically distributed end de-
vices. However, we show that this approach is susceptible to a
basic threat of frame delay attack that can be implemented by a
combination of stealthy jamming and delayed replay. As the attack
does not need to break the cryptographic protection of the frame,
existing security measures prescribed by LoRaWAN cannot coun-
teract this threat. To address this attack, we propose a gateway
design called SoftLoRa that integrates a low-power SDR receiver
with a LoRaWAN gateway. We design efficient time-domain sig-
nal processing algorithms based on the CSS modulationmethod to
estimate the frequency biases of the end devices. Our algorithms
achieve a resolution of 0.14 ppm of the carrier frequency, which is
sufficient to uncover the additional frequency biases introduced
by the replay step of the frame delay attack. In summary, with
SoftLoRa gateway, we present a cost-effective defense approach
for the low-overhead synchronization-free data timestamping ap-
proach against the frame delay attack.
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